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HOLLOWED-OUT DEMOCRACY
KATE ANDRIAS*
Professors Joseph Fishkin’s and Heather Gerken’s essay for this
symposium, The Two Trends That Matter for Party Politics, along
with the larger project of which it is a part, marks a notable turn (or
return) in the law-of-democracy field.1 Unlike much recent
scholarship, Fishkin’s and Gerken’s work does not offer a
comprehensive theory of corruption or equality, but instead analyzes
the relationship between campaign finance law and the actual
functioning of political parties in our democracy.
In brief, Fishkin and Gerken tell us that our contemporary
political parties are at once highly polarized and oddly weak. They
claim this is so because of a shift in the center of gravity of the parties,
away from the formal party structure and toward “shadow parties.”
These shadow parties, controlled by big donors, undermine the
influence of “the party faithful,” i.e., everyday voters who provide the
energy and backbone of the political parties through volunteering,
attending caucuses and conventions, and making small donations. On
this view, the potential of McCutcheon v. FEC to reinvigorate parties
may be overstated.2 The decision, Fishkin and Gerken warn, is more
likely to exacerbate the trend toward shadow parties, rather than to
encourage formal parties populated by party activists.3
Fishkin’s and Gerken’s focus on the evolution of political parties
promises to open up a productive and challenging new conversation.
But I have two concerns about their arguments. First, it is not clear
that the formal parties, at least on the national level, are actually
comprised of the party faithful. The Democratic and Republican
Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Committees have, for many
years, been national fundraising organizations, organized and
* Copyright © Kate Andrias, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School.
1 Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends That Matter for Party
Politics, N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32 (2014).
2 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). Cf. Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, Commentary, After
McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 373, 374 (June 20, 2014), available at
http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/vol127_Elias_Berkon.pdf
(arguing that the “big winner” of McCutcheon “is likely to be the group that suffers most
under today’s regime: political parties”).
3 Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 1, at 39–40.
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controlled by senior federal elected officials, with no grassroots base.
Meanwhile, both the Democratic National Committee and the
Republican National Committee have functioned primarily as
campaign service vendors.4 In short, Fishkin and Gerken’s important
critique could have been launched at the formal parties themselves as
they existed even before casting shadows.
Second, while Fishkin and Gerken are correct to worry about the
dominance of the elite in our democratic organizations, for that
conversation to have real impact on the vitality of our democracy, it
must be expanded beyond political parties. That is, Fishkin’s and
Gerken’s conception of the problem (the “hollowed-out” party5) and
their implied solution (a robust role for party activists), while apt, are
too narrow. In fact, the hollowed-out party and the legal edifice that
has enabled it are but one small part of a broader hollowing out of
our democracy and our doctrine: We lack participatory institutions
that enable the vast majority of citizens, particularly low- and middleincome Americans, to engage in politics and governance—and we
want for a conception of the First Amendment broad enough to
encourage and protect such collective efforts.6
Far more than a short response piece is necessary to support
these claims. But consider this sketch: Broad-based membership
organizations in the United States have withered over the course of
the last half-century. The problem lies not only with the political
parties. Labor unions have shrunk while representatively governed
civic organizations, once flourishing, have been replaced by
professionally managed advocacy groups.7 The organizations that now
4 See Daniel J. Galvin, The Transformation of Political Institutions: Investments in
Institutional Resources and Gradual Change in the National Party Committees, 26 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 50, 52, 57–59 (2012) (explaining that “the national committees now play a
supportive role, offering resources and services to candidates who seek their help” and
dating fundamental changes in the national party committees to the 1930s for the
Republicans and the 1980s for the Democrats).
5 Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 1, at 47.
6 On the paucity of our current First Amendment conception in the realm of politics,
see Robert F. Bauer, The Right to “Do Politics” and Not Just to Speak: Thinking About the
Constitutional Protections for Political Action, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 69
(2013) (critiquing the purely speech-focused First Amendment analysis as it has been
applied to coordination rules and arguing for a broader right to “do politics”); JOHN D.
INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012) (tracing
the disappearance of the right of assembly from constitutional law and arguing for its
return); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE (2012)
(arguing for a revival of the constitutional right to petition the government for redress of
grievances).
7 See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY 128, 127–74 (2003) (describing
“civic America’s . . . transition from membership activities to professionally managed
institutions” in the twentieth century); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE
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participate in national politics represent an array of interests, but few
are composed of, and governed by, cross-sections of ordinary
Americans.8 Like the shadow parties described by Professors Fishkin
and Gerken, even organizations representing the “public” interest are
heavily reliant on big donors; elites drive their decisions and shape
their messages.
In short, our democracy is lacking the active participation of
most Americans. Not only do middle class and poor Americans vote
at lower rates,9 but they have far less input and power at every step of
national governance. Organizations advocating on behalf of the
wealthy far outnumber and outspend representatives for the middle
class and the poor. “Of the billions of dollars devoted annually on
lobbying in Washington, 72 percent is spent by organizations
representing business interests; in contrast, . . . 1 percent is spent by
unions, and less than 1 percent is spent by organizations advocating
on behalf of social welfare programs or the poor.”10
The political reform movement, at least since the seminal case of
Buckley v. Valeo,11 has attempted to address this imbalance. But it has
done so not by building organizations of workers and citizens to draw
Americans into the democratic process and to contend equally with
business interests, but rather by trying to insulate elected officials
from the corrupting influence of money.12 Meanwhile, the doctrine
has followed a similarly narrow path: Campaign finance cases since
Buckley have focused on the right to speak, not on a broader right to
participate in the democratic process.13
Ironically, the majority opinion in McCutcheon might offer a
glimmer of an alternative, recognizing that efforts to influence the
(2000) (examining the deterioration of American civil society); RICHARD B. FREEMAN,
AMERICA WORKS: THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S. LABOR MARKET 75–92 (2007) (describing
and analyzing the decline of the American labor movement).
8 SKOCPOL, supra note 7, at 127–74; see also KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY
VERBA, & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 440, 431–42 (2012)
(explaining that business interests are well represented in organized politics while “the less
privileged” are significantly less represented).
9 See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA, & BRADY, supra note 8, at 153, 174 (noting that political
participation in America varies widely based on social class).
10 Kay Lehman Schlozman, The Role of Interest Groups, BOS. REV., July–Aug. 2012,
http://new.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/ndf_kay_lehman_schlozman_money_politics_democr
acy.php. Of the remaining money spent, the vast majority is from institutions, some by
states and local government, and “2 percent is spent by public interest groups (a category
that includes both liberal and conservative advocates).” Id.; SCHLOZMAN, VERBA, &
BRADY, supra note 8, at 431, 441–42.
11 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (imposing, inter alia, limits on individual contributions to federal candidates).
13 Bauer, supra note 6, at 68–69.
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electoral process include a variety of activities beyond pure speech.
The Court opens: “There is no right more basic in our democracy
than the right to participate in electing our political leaders.”14 And it
repeatedly emphasizes the importance of political association.15 The
Court’s analysis in McCutcheon is, I believe, deeply flawed: its
understanding of political participation too individualistic and
monetized; its view of corruption too narrow; and its concern for the
tribulations of the super-rich puzzling. Nonetheless, the McCutcheon
opinion, in its emphasis on association and participation, may hint at
a possible path for a new reform agenda.
Those who worry about the corrupting influence of money and
about the problem of political inequality ought to think seriously
about the Court’s gesture toward political association. There may well
be more to gain from a reform movement that seeks to facilitate
enduring, broad-based membership organizations composed of crosssections of ordinary Americans, rather than one that seeks only to
insulate politicians from the flow of money, or, as Fishkin and Gerken
do, to rechannel its flow. In short, efforts to enshrine a broader
conception of political equality and anticorruption in the doctrine
remain important. Yet, we must also look beyond campaign finance
regulation to the laws that govern collective organizations of
workers,16 the political activity of nonprofits,17 and the broader rights
to associate, assemble, and petition.18 Given that many familiar
models of membership—traditional labor unions, fraternal civic
organizations, civil rights groups, as well as participatory political
party organizations—have atrophied, such a reform effort no doubt
will require creativity, along with herculean effort. But our
democracy might well depend on it.

14

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014).
See, e.g., id. at 1448 (“[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to
participate in the public debate through political expression and political association.”).
16 For one account of how labor law might be reformed to encourage more political
power for workers, see Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without
Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013).
17 See SKOCPOL, supra note 7, at 286–88 (noting tax laws that push associations
toward expert-driven strategies and arguing for the repeal of rules designed to create
firewalls between partisan and nonpartisan activities).
18 See INAZU, supra note 6 (arguing in favor of the right of assembly);
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 6 (arguing in favor of the right of petition).
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